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INTRODUCTION

With the significant domestic and international economic influence exercised by organized crime, money laundering has become an
indispensable element of "the Mob's" activities. According to a conservative estimate of the President's Commission on Organized Crime,
organized crime in America netted income in excess of $67 billion in
1986 alone.' It is believed that between $5 and $15 billion in illegal
drug money earned in the United States moves into international financial channels each year.' Narcotics traffickers may even hold substantial interests in United States government securities, since, in
1985, net purchases of United States equities by Latin American and
Caribbean investors totaled $1.7 billion, a 250% increase over the previous year, while investments in government bonds and notes saw a
threefold increase, to $4.3 billion.8 Drug trafficking and flight capital
are equally plausible explanations for this surge, but the proportionate
share due to each is unknown.
Without the ability to move and hide its enormous wealth, organized crime would never have become the threat it is today. Drug cartels
could operate only at a small fraction of current levels, and with far
less flexibility in the absence of money laundering. The confluence of
illicit wealth coursing through the stream of legitimate commerce has
created an elite class of criminals thought to be untouchable. Interna1. WHARTON ECONOMETRIC FORECASTING ASSOCIATES, INC., THE INCOME OF ORGANIZED
CRIME (1986), reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE IMPACM. ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 413

(1986). This income caused a $17 billion reduction in the gross national product, lost tax
revenues of $6 billion, a loss of 394,000 jobs, and a .3 percent increase in consumer
prices. Id.
2.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTI-

13 (1984) [hereinafter
3. Frank, See No Evil, FORBES, Oct. 6, 1986, at 40.

TUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING

THE CASH CONNECTION].
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tional financier Michele Sindona explained the inevitable outcome of
unfettered money laundering:
The real evil of money laundering is its power to allow dirty
money-the instrument of crime-to enter the mainstream of
economies undisturbed, to consume important sectors of those
economies and transform them into feudi of an international
criminal oligarchy beyond the reach of the law-an oligarchy
that is to be brought down by [those] who do not understand
money.'
Sindona's correct view of the power of the money launderer stood
in contrast to United States law, which failed to address the problem
until recently.5 Now that money laundering has been made a crin inal
offense, the hidden economic strength of organized crime has become a
lasting vulnerability. This is because dirty money is always in motion,
often moving through aboveground investments and financial institutions. It is now exposed to unprecedented view by a matrix of new laws
which can undo years of illegal profit-making through a single,
thoughtful prosecution, thus seriously undermining even the most entrenched criminal organization.
This article will focus on the substantive and procedural ways in
which the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (as modified by the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988), and other statutes will impact upon international financial transactions and institutions, and upon the money
laundering phenomenon.
II.

THE MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL ACT OF

1986

Congress enacted the Money Laundering Control Act of 19861 (the
Act) as a direct response to a problem which was clearly out of hand.
When President Reagan signed the Act into law on October 27, 1986,
4. N. ToSCHES, POWER ON EARTH 89 (1986). Michele Sindona was convicted of causing
the collapse of the Franklin National Bank. See United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981). He was subsequently deposed by the
President's Commission on Organized Crime. See THE CASH CONNECTIoNi, supra note 2,
at 7. He eventually died in a prison cell in Italy after taking cyani a. See Michele
Sindona, Jailed Italian Financier Dies of Cyanide Poisoning, N.Y. L'imes, Mar. 23,
1986, § 1, at 44, col. 1.
5. See United States v. $4,255,625.39, 551 F. Supp. 314 (S.D. Fla. 1982) for the first
use of the term "money laundering" in a reported case. This action sought forfeiture of a
portion of over $400 million in Colombian cocaine money ostensibly laundered in Dade
County, Florida during a sixteen-month period in 1981 and 1982. Id.
6. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, § 1352(a), 100 Stat. 3207
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (Supp. IV 1986)). For legislative history,
see 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5393.
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the profits of organized crime were brought well within the reach of
federal law. The law does nothing less than strike at the profit motive
for criminal conduct. It is revolutionary in legal and practical concept
because of the ways it seeks to deter, detect and punish those who
would launder for criminal purposes, while depriving them of their
wealth. Unfortunately, financial institutions are bound to become involved as the Act provokes widespread investigations.
The first major use of the Act is indicative of its effectiveness
against drug money launderers. On June i2, 1987, Attorney General
Edwin Meese announced criminal charges against 160 people, and the
seizure of $20 million in cash, 2,100 pounds of cocaine and $1.5 million
in other assets.7 Those charged had been part of laundering rings operating in New York, Newark, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago and
Detroit, which had funneled over $175 million from the United States
to destinations such as Switzerland and Tokyo.8 This FBI undercover
operation, however, was notable for other reasons. First, the Panamanian government seized traffickers' bank accounts in Panama for the
first time, and, second, Colombians were lured to a sailboat off Aruba
where they were arrested by the FBI." Actions such as these presage
the international impact and application of the Act.
In the most general terms, the Act: 1) makes criminal those financial transactions which involve the proceeds of crime; 2) raises asset
tracing and forfeiture to a level as significant as incarceration of those
convicted; 3) addresses those issues on an international scale; and 4)
reinforces the importance attached to the currency reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act 1" and the Internal Revenue Code." The
language of the Act is so intricate and its scope so comprehensive that
this article will focus primarily on the law's international aspects. To
do this, however, requires some understanding of the integrated mix of
criminal, civil, regulatory and private sector measures which the Act
focuses on illegal economic gain.
7.

Werner, Scores Arrested in Money Laundering,N.Y. Times, June 13, 1987, § 1, at

8, col. 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Bank Secrecy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 995 (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314, 5316-5324 (1982, Supp. II 1984 & Supp. IV 1986)). Among
other things, the Bank Secrecy Act requires that financial institutions report currency
transactions in excess of $10,000 to the Treasury Department. Id. § 5316. See also U.S.
DEPT. op JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, tits. 9.9-79.200 to 9.9-79.320 (1984) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL].
11. I.R.C. § 60501 (1984). The Internal Revenue Code imposes reporting requirements for cash transactions over $10,000 in a trade or business, and for causing another
to fail to file this information. Id.
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In various ways, the Act adopts the primary recommendations of
the President's Commission on Organized Crime: a) that money laundering be made a substantive criminal offense;"' b) that the Right to
Financial Privacy Act be amended to facilitate the flow of information
from financial institutions to enforcement authorities;18 and c) that the
new money laundering offenses be given extraterritorial effect.1 4 There
were several reasons for creating separate money laundering offenses.
First was the recognition that money launderers who complied with the
reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act operated "with virtual
impunity."" Second was that the Bank Secrecy Act "as a major law
enforcement tool had been rendered a virtual nullity by an industry
that didn't seem to care."" Third was the desire "to further deter the
12. THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 2, at 61-63, 67-69.
13. Id. at 59, 75-76.
14. Id. at 69.
15. Id. at 61.
16. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, COMPREHENSIVE MONEY
LAUNDERING PREVENTION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 746, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1986) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. Although several congressional committees exhaustively examined
the issue of money laundering, the House Banking Committee best described the limitations of the Bank Secrecy Act:
Sixteen years ago, the Committee on Banking, in efforts to wage war on organized crime, drug traffickers, tax evaders, and various other white collar criminals,
reported out what is commonly known as the Bank Secrecy Act. At that time,
and many times since, this Committee, to ensure compliance with the Act, has
encouraged, consulted, and issued directions to the Department of the Treasury
(which is charged with implementation of the Act), the banking regulators (who
have been delegated certain responsibilities), the banks and other financial
institutions.
Unfortunately, the hearings on money laundering beginning with the Bank
of Boston hearing in April 1985, have shown that a major law enforcement tool
has been rendered a virtual nullity by an industry that didn't seem to care and
by a regulatory structure that proved to be ineffective.
The Committee fully agrees with what the Chairman of the Committee, Fernand J. St. Germain, said in his opening statement at the Bank of Boston
hearings:
I want the banking industry, the regulators, and the American public to
understand that we are going to insist on full enforcement and compliance
with the Bank Secrecy Act and we will not tolerate the selective compliance
and enforcement that has damaged the effectiveness of the act as a law enforcement weapon .... [Blank officials need not be corrupt or into conspiracies for organized crime; it is enough that bank officials ... be sloppy and
that they operate without controls and without really caring.
Without access to the American financial system, drug dealers are crippled
and their activities are laid open to law enforcement agencies .... Passage of the
legislation, together with other proposed legislative remedies outside the jurisdiction of this Committee, however, would substantially paralyze the international drug trafficker.
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growth of money laundering."' 7
A.

Enhanced Enforcement Capabilities

The Act strengthens the Bank Secrecy Act compliance function of
the Department of the Treasury in a number of ways. First, the Treasury Department now has an enforceable summons authority." Second, attempts to evade Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements can
result in imposition of civil penalties.' 9 Third, increased maximum civil
penalties can range from $25,000 to $100,000 for each willful violation
of the Bank Secrecy Act, although a new $500 penalty for each negligent violation provides some additional discretion for the Treasury Department in the imposition of civil penalties.20 Lastly, the criminal
penalties for structuring transactions to evade the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act have been increased.2 '
Id. at 15-16. Non-compliance with Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements appears to
have been widespread. In 1984, financial institutions filed 700,000 currency transaction
reports with the Department of Treasury. After the Bank of Boston pleaded guilty to
Bank Secrecy Act violations in February 1985, the number of reports filed escalated to
well over 3,000,000 in 1986. See GeneralAccounting Office Findings on the Enforcement
of the Bank Secrecy Act, 1986: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1986)
(statement of Francis A. Keating II, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Enforcement
Division).
17. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, THE MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMEs ACT OF 1986, S.
REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1986) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. The Senate
Judiciary Committee explained the purpose of money laundering legislation as follows:
To create a Federal offense against money laundering; to authorize forfeiture of
the profits earned by launderers; to encourage financial institutions to come forward with information about money launderers without fear of civil liability; to
provide Federal law enforcement agencies with additional tools to investigate
money laundering; and to enhance the penalties under existing law in order to
further deter the growth of money laundering. The Committee believes that only
through the collective effort of Federal law enforcement agencies, financial institutions and individuals will the Government be successful in its efforts to curb
the spread of money laundering, by which criminals have successfully disguised
the nature and source of funds from their illegal enterprises.
Id.
18. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1986). A Treasury summons is enforceable in
any court of the United States in whose jurisdiction:
1. The investigation which gave rise to the summons is being carried on;
2. The person is an inhabitant; or
3. The person summoned carries on business or may be found.
Id. § 5318(e)(2).
19. Id. § 5321(a)(4).
20. Id. § 5321(a)(6).
21. Id. § 5322. The penalty for a willful violation of the Act is a fine of not more than
$500,000, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both. Id. § 5322(b).
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The Act requires federally insured banks to adopt Bank Secrecy
Act compliance procedures which are to be examined by bank regulatory agencies. 2 The Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Bank and other agencies
have placed ultimate responsibility for Bank Secrecy Act compliance in
the hands of boards of directors of federally insured financial institutions."3 By unusual uniform regulations implementing the Act, corporate boards must approve and adopt Bank Secrecy Act compliance pro24
cedures in a manner which is reflected in the corporate minutes.
Failure to maintain adequate compliance procedures can result in institutional and personal civil penalties of $1,000 per day, imposed following an agency cease and desist order.25 Through amendments to the
Bank Control Act and Savings and Loan Control Act, the Act makes
the acquiring party's past record of Bank Secrecy Act violations relevant to approval of bank acquisitions."
The Act also provides criminal enforcement authorities with additional tools for their trade. Substantive laundering crimes are predicate
offenses for purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (RICO) 27 and the Travel Act.2 8 As is already the case
with Bank Secrecy Act violations, court-authorized electronic surveillance may be used to gather evidence of possible violations of several
of the new offenses.2 This new matrix of investigative aids will change
the character of "paper trail" investigations and the consequent nature
of proof offered at trial. The combination of RICO, new money laundering offenses, and electronic surveillance is likely to produce more
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(s) (Supp. IV 1986).
23. See id. § 1818(a), (j).
24. 12 C.F.R. § 563.17-7 (1988). Regulators require federally insured financial institutions to establish procedures reasonably designed to assure and monitor compliance with
the Bank Secrecy Act. At a minimum, these procedures must be reduced to writing, be
approved by the insured institution's board of directors, and be reflected in the minutes
of the institution. Furthermore, the procedures must:
1. Provide for a system of internal controls to insure ongoing compliance;
2. Provide for independent testing for compliance by an insured institutions'
board of directors or by an outside party;
3. Provide training for appropriate personnel; and
4. Designate an individual or individuals responsible for coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance.

Id.
25.
26.
27.

12 U.S.C. §§ 93(b)(1), 1818(i)(2)(i) (1982); see also 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(h) (1987).
12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(1)(D) (Supp. IV 1986).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986) (incorporating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957

into RICO).

28. Id. § 1952(b) (incorporating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 into the Travel Act).
29. Id. § 2516(1)(c), (g).
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"real time, high tech" intrusion into potential criminal conduct, even

in cases where organized crime is not involved, while reducing the role
of old-fashioned books and records, and the reconstruction of past
events, to mere corroborative evidence."0
Although each of these-the role of corporate boards, enhanced
enforcement capabilities, increased information flow and a strengthened Bank Secrecy Act-is significant, the key to the Act is the manner by which money laundering has been made criminal in a substantive sense.31
B.

Money Laundering as a Substantive Offense

Money laundering is the process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, and then disguises
30. Id.
31. The process of money laundering has also been made criminal in the states of
California, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.9-186.10 (West 1987), and Arizona, ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-2317 (Supp. 1988).
Money laundering is also the focus of intense international interest. In December
1988, forty-four nations, including the United States, but not Switzerland, became signatories to the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances which requires signatories to relax their banking secrecy laws
and to make money laundering a crime and an extraditable offense. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20,
1988, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989). Likewise, in England, the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act focuses on those who assist another to retain or control the proceeds of drug
trafficking. It states in pertinent part:
(1) [I]f a person enters into or is otherwise concerned in an arrangement
whereby:
(a)
the retention or control by or on behalf of another (call him "A") of A's
proceeds of drug trafficking is facilitated (whether by concealment, removal from the jurisdiction, transfer to nominees or otherwise), or
(b)
A's proceeds of drug trafficking;
(i)
are used to secure that funds are placed at
A's disposal, or
(ii)
are used for A's benefit to acquire property by way of investment,
knowing or suspecting that A is a person who carries on or has carried on drug trafficking or has benefited from drug trafficking, he is
guilty of an offense.
Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986, chs. 24, 32. Legislation making money laundering a
crime is about to be introduced in Switzerland, with Italy likely to follow. Financial
Times, May 12, 1989, § 1, at 2.
In January 1989, the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory
Practices-consisting of the governors of the central banks of the United States,
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and Luxembourg-signed an accord of principles to encourage the
implementation of practices to eliminate money laundering. 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) No.
5, at 218 (1989).
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that income to make it appear legitimate.8 s The Act creates three categories of laundering offenses-the conduct of,8" or attempt to conduct:' (a) financial transactions involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; 5 (b) the international transportation of such
proceeds; 6 and (c) monetary transactions in property constituting, or
32. THE CASH CONNECTMON, supra note 2, at 7. Michele Sindona described laundering
as a two-step process: "Dirty money is money made through crime-drug money. It is
illegal gain. It can be hidden, but it cannot be used in the light of day unless its owner
can make it appear to be legitimate, tax-paid income. Many people hide dirty money....
Most people confuse hiding and laundering." N. ToSCHES, supra note 4, at 87.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). This term includes "initiating, concluding
or participating in initiating, or concluding a transaction." Id.
34 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), (2), 1957(a) (Supp. IV 1986), amended by the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6471(a), 102 Stat. 4378 (Supp. 1989).
35. Section 1956(a)(1) of the Act states:
(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section
7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal
law, shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice
the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is
greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986), amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-690, § 6471(a), 102 Stat. 4378 (Supp. 1989).
36. Section 1956(a)(2) of the Act states:
(2) Whoever transports, transmits or transfers or attempts to transport, transmit or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United
States to or through a place outside the United States or to a place in the
United States from or through a place outside the United States(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
(B) knowing that the monetary instruments or funds involved in the transportation represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and
knowing that such transportation is designed in whole or in part(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal
law shall be sentenced to a fine of $500,000 or twice the value of the
monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or
both.
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derived from, the proceeds obtained from a criminal offense.37 The proceeds must be generated by "specified unlawful activity," a term of art
under the Act."8 The Act, however, fails to provide a definition of the
term "proceeds"' and exempts monetary transactions "necessary to
as guaranteed by the sixth
preserve a person's right to representation
0
amendment to the Constitution.'4

The Act not only reaches for the proceeds of conduct characteristic of organized crime such as narcotics trafficking, RICO predicates, or
certain state offenses, but also encompasses thirty-one additional criminal offenses ranging from espionage to trading with the enemy. " In
Id. § 1956(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986), amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, § 6471(b), 102 Stat. 4378 (Supp. 1989).
37. Section 1957 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever, in any of the circumstances set forth in subsection (d), knowingly
engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived
property of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful
activity, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
Id. § 1957(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (Supp. IV 1986). See infra note 41 for the complete text of
the Act.
39. Similarly, the RICO statute, which makes it a crime to use or invest the "income
or the proceeds of such income" derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, fals to
define the term "proceeds" in an interstate enterprise, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982), as
does the narcotics forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986), which also
uses the term.
Given the expansive legislative intent behind the Act, the concept of proceeds
should not be bound by technical accounting terms such as income, profit, capital or the
like. Rather, the idea of proceeds should emerge as Sindona's notion of "money made
through crime.., illegal gain," N. ToscHEs, supra note 4, at 87, mirroring RICO's purpose "to remove the profits from organized crime by separating the racketeer from his
dishonest gains." Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27-28 (1983).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1986), amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6182, 102 Stat. 4354 (Supp. 1989).
41. The broad applicability of the Money Laundering Control Act is evident from the
encompassing definition given to the term "specified unlawful activity" under Section
1956(c)(7):
The term "specified unlawful activity" means:
(A) any act or activity constituting an offense listed in Section 1961(1) of this
title except an act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act;
(B) with respect to a financial transaction occurring in whole or in part in the
United States, an offense against a foreign nation involving the manufacture, importation, sale or distribution of a controlled substance (as such
term is defined for the purposes of the Controlled Substances Act);
(C) any act or acts constituting a -continuing criminal enterprise, as that term
is defined in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 848);
or
(D) an offense under section 152 (relating to concealment of assets; false oaths
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addition, promotion of tax evasion has recently been added to the
and claims, bribery) section 215 (relating to commissions or gifts for procuring loans), any of sections 500 through 503 (relating to certain counterfeiting offenses), section 513 (relating to securities of States and private
entities), section 545 (relating to smuggling goods into the United States),
section 549 (relating to removing goods from Customs custody), section 641
(relating to public money, property, or records), section 656 (relating to
theft, embezzlement, or misapplication by bank officer or employee), section 666 (relating to theft or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal
funds), section 657 (relating to lending, credit, and insurance institutions),
section 658 (relating to property mortgaged or pledged to farm credit agencies), section 793, 794, or 798 (relating to espionage), section 875 (relating
to interstate communications) section 1201 (relating to kidnapping), section 1203 (relating to hostage taking), section 1344 (relating to bank
fraud), or section 2113 or 2114 (relating to bank and postal robbery and
theft) of this title, section 2319 (relating to copyright infringement), section 310 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 830) (relating to precursor and essential chemicals), section 590 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19
U.S.C. 1590) (relating to aviation smuggling), section 1822 of the Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act (100 Stat. 3207-51; 21 U.S.C. 857) (relating to transportation of drug paraphernalia), section 38(c) (relating to
criminal violations) of the Arms Export Control Act, section 11 (relating to
violations) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 206 (relating
to penalties) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or section 16 (relating to offenses and punishment) of the Trading with the Enemy Act.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (Supp. IV 1986), amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, §
6183, 102 Stat. 4354 (Supp. 1989). In connection with subsection (c)(7)(A) above, 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) of RICO defines racketeering activity as:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotics or
other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year;
(B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating
to sports bribery), section 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting),
section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable
under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from
pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate
credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling
information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to
wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503
(relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of
criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State
or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a
witness, victim or an informant), section 1951 (relating to interference with
commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering),
section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section
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list."2
Thus, in one stroke, the potency of RICO has been doubled since
the number of RICO predicate offenses has been effectively doubled.
The possible permutations and combinations of RICO predicate offenses are now virtually without limit. Thus, it is accurate to say that
what began as a measure to control the drug trade of organized crime
has resulted in a law that targets financial crime in ways novel to
American jurisprudence.
Although the proceeds of crime historically have been subject to
seizure by warrant for use as evidence,48 the Act makes criminal proceeds perpetually illegal. Long after the criminal offense which generated the proceeds has come to an end, those who conduct prohibited
financial transactions or international transportation engage in criminal conduct independent of the income-producing original crime. The
Act tracks the proceeds one step further, seeking to deprive criminals
of the effective use and investment of the fruits of their crimes. The
concept is to bar "monetary transactions" in "criminally derived property.""" The Act does not limit itself to transactions conducted through
1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section
1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957
(relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from
specified unlawful activity), section 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to
interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346
(relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating
to white slave traffic);
(C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186
(dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501 (relating to embezzlement from union funds),
(D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in
the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving,
concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States, or
(E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
42.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (Supp. IV 1986), amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6183, 102 Stat. 4354 (Supp. 1989). The main difference from
a simple tax evasion offense, 26 I.R.C. §§ 7201-7206, is that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
requires that the money be criminally derived, and the defendant must know the money
is criminally derived.
43. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1).
44. Section 1957 of the Act defines these terms as follows:
(f) As used in this section(1) the term "monetary transaction" means the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds
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financial institutions 5 but appears to reach a broad variety of routine
commercial transactions which affect commerce.' 6
or a monetary instrument (as defined in section 1956(c)(5) of the title)
by, through or to a financial institution (as defined in section 5312 of
title 31), but such term does not include any transaction necessary to
preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) the term "criminally derived property" means any property constituting
or derived from proceeds obtained from a criminal offense.
18 U.S.C. § 1957(0 (Supp. IV 1986). Similar language is found in 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1)
(Supp. II 1984) which calls for the forfeiture of "any property constituting, or derived
from, any proceeds" of the drug trade.
45. The President's Commission on Organized Crime tailored its recommendations to
focus solely on money laundering conducted through financial institutions, as did a bill
introduced by Senators D'Amato, Proxmire and others, S. 572, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985), which was identical to the Commission's proposed legislation. Compare THE CASH
CONNECTION, supra note 2, at 67-69 with Money LaunderingLegislation, 1986: Hearings
on S. 572, S. 1335, and S. 1385 of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 38-43 (1985) [hereinafter Senate Hearings];see also SENATE REPORT, supra note
17, at 4-5.
That Congress more fully exercised its authority to control money laundering underscores a legislative intent that the Money Laundering Control Act should be construed
broadly. In California Bankers Assoc. v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), which upheld the
constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act, the Supreme Court traced the outlines of congressional power in this area:
The plenary authority of Congress over both interstate and foreign commerce is
not open to dispute, and that body was not limited to any one particular approach to effectuate its concern that negotiable instruments moving in the channels of that commerce were significantly aiding criminal enterprise.... Congress
could have closed the channels of commerce entirely to negotiable instruments,
had it thought that so drastic a solution was warranted; it could have made the
transmissionof the proceeds of any criminalactivity by negotiable instruments
in interstate or foreign commerce a separate criminal offense.
Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added).
46. The Act defines with some precision the terms "transaction" and "financial transaction" as follows:
(3) the term "transaction" includes a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer,
delivery, or other disposition, and with respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, or any other payment,
transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever
means effected;
(4) the term "financial transaction" means a transaction involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or involving one or more monetary
instruments, which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce, or a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce
in any way or degree;
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3), (4) (Supp. IV 1986).
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C. Knowledge and Intent
During the legislative process, debate raged over whether any new
substantive money laundering offense should be premised only on "actual knowledge," and not on lesser standards such as "reckless disregard" or "reason to know." ' The Act makes no reference to either of
these latter two standards of intent, but the Senate report on laundering legislation equates knowledge with "willful blindness" or "conscious avoidance of knowledge," 4 a notion common in the criminal
law."9 Given its close attention to the knowledge issue, Congress certainly intended to adopt the general rule that deliberately closing one's
eyes is tantamount to actual knowledge for purposes of all of the laundering offenses.
The mens rea element of the new substantive laundering offenses
is of special interest to financial institutions. To be held liable for
criminally laundering monetary instruments, one must be aware that
"the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from
some form, though not necessarily which form" of felonious activity."'
In addition, one must intend to promote specified unlawful activity, or
to take action knowing that the transaction is designed to conceal information about the proceeds of specified criminal activity, or intend
to evade a transaction reporting requirement under state or federal
47. See, e.g., Tax Evasion, Drug Trafficking And Money Laundering As They Involve FinancialInstitutions, 1986: Hearingson H..R. 1367, 1474, 1945, 2785, 3892, 4280,
4573 Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions, Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of The Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
1036-1041 (1986) (statement of James D. Harmon, Jr., Executive Director and Chief
Counsel, President's Commission on Organized Crime).
48. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 9-10.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Hanlon, 548 F.2d 1096, 1101. (2d Cir. 1977) ("It is
settled law that a finding of guilty knowledge may not be avoided by a showing that the
defendant closed his eyes to what was going on about him ... ").
In clarifying the obligations of financial institutions under the Bank Secrecy Act to
report multiple currency transactions aggregating to more than $10,000, the Treasury
Department cited United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 426 U.S.
951 (1976), in support of its position that knowledge "includes the concept of willful
blindness... [and] applies to a person who has deliberately avoided positive knowledge.
." 52 Fed. Reg. 11436, 11437 (1987).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), (c)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). The Department of Justice has
proposed that the Act's current language, "which in fact involves," be changed to read
"or is believed to involve." Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and the Regulations
Implementing the Bank Secrecy Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 88, 119 (1987) (testimony of William
Weld, Assistant Attorney General) [hereinafter Committee Hearing].
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law."'
An example may illustrate the point that one who purposely launders the proceeds of "some form" of a felony may be guilty of money
laundering as long as the proceeds are "in fact" from some specified
unlawful activity.52 A bank teller who has every reason to believe that a
series of cash deposits, each slightly less that $10,000, are the proceeds
of an illegal gambling operation, but deliberately closes his eyes to this
situation, may create criminal liability for the bank, even if the cash
turns out to be drug money."
The idea that mistaking one type of criminal proceeds for another
is no defense is also seen in the international transportation and criminally derived property offenses. Under the former, one must know that
the transported funds represent "the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,"" though not necessarily which specified unlawful activity.
The criminally derived property statute deals with the planned obscurity of laundering transactions in a similar way. A person "knowing"
that a transaction involves "property constituting, or derived from,
proceeds obtained from a criminal offense," which is in fact derived
from specified unlawful activity, is said to act with the requisite criminal knowledge.5"
For financial institutions, there exists an uncertain connection between the idea of "avoidance of knowledge" and their enhanced ability
to communicate with enforcement authorities. The Act has broadened,
51. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A), (B)(i), (ii) (Supp. IV 1986); FLA.
655.50 (1984 & Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-910 to 7-1-915 (Supp. 1988).
52.

STAT. §

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), (c)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).

53. The Act does not change the general rule of corporate criminal liability which
generally depends on the respondeat superior doctrine, that is, an act of an employee
within the scope of his authority in furtherance of corporate interests binds the corporation. See, e.g., New York Cent. & H.R.R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). In
some instances, however, a corporation may be criminally liable for the conduct of its
supervisory employees who had either intentionally disregarded the law or acted with
plain indifference to its requirements. United States v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir.
1978); see also United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 328 (1987) (bank's conviction of Bank Secrecy Act violations based on
"flagrant organizational indifference" and "collective knowledge" theories affirmed); Tippecanoe Beverages, Inc., v. S.A. El Aquila Brewing Co., 833 F.2d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 1987)
("[Tihe corporation itself cannot be blameworthy in an intelligible moral sense.");
United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1983) ("While a corporation has no independent state of mind, the acts of individuals on its behalf may be
properly chargeable to it.").

54. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(c) (Supp. IV 1986). The Act provides in pertinent part that "in a
prosecution for an offense under this section, the Government is not required to prove
the defendant knew that the offense from which the criminally derived property was
derived was specified unlawful activity." Id.
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yet made more specific, permissible disclosure under the Right to Financial Privacy Act,"" so that information identifying a customer and
account and "the nature of any suspected illegal activity" may be furnished to enforcement authorities without a subpoena, court order or
liability for such disclosure." This liberalization preempts any state
disclosure law which is more restrictive." The Right to Financial Privacy Act, as amended, now states plainly that a financial institution or
its employee "shall not be liable to the customer" for disclosure of suspected criminal activity.59 In other words, a bank is protected when
disclosure authorized by law is made in good faith.
Disclosure, however, is permissive, not mandatory. Thus, the dilemma posed for financial institutions is evident: Where illegal activity
is only suspected, can a financial institution ever avoid a charge of willful blindness by not disclosing the suspected illegal activity to enforcement authorities? The quandary for financial institutions is how to
avoid crossing the line between unreported suspicion and passive complicity. Liberal, but standardized, disclosure practices and extreme
caution should be the watchwords here.
D. The Consequences of Money Laundering
The laundering offenses created by the Act carry both criminal
penalties and civil sanctions. The criminal penalties consist of imprisonment, fines and forfeiture which vary with the type of offense, while
the civil sanctions are limited to severe monetary penalties and
forfeiture.
Specifically, the term of imprisonment for the financial transaction
and international transportation offenses is twenty years, the possible
fine is $500,000 or twice the value of the monetary instruments or
funds laundered, or both imprisonment and a fine may be imposed."
In addition, the Department of the Treasury' may impose a civil penalty of "not more than the greater of - (1) the value of the property,
funds or monetary instruments involved in the transaction; or (2)
$10,000" for these offenses.2 Engaging in transactions involving criminally derived property subjects a person to ten years imprisonment, a
56. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
58. Id.
59. Id. Wrongful disclosure, however, may entitle a customer to recover actual and
punitive damages and attorneys' fees. See 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), (2) (Supp. IV 1986).
61. Id. § 1956(e).
62. Id. § 1956(b)(1), (2).
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fine, or both,6" or an alternative fine of not more than twice the
amount involved in the transaction, or $250,000 plus twice the pecuniary gain from the offense or loss to the victim." There is, however, no
civil penalty provision for the derived property offense. Each of the
three substantive laundering offenses can also result in the civil or
criminal forfeiture of "[a]ny property, real or personal, involved in a
transaction in violation of section 5313(a) or 5324 of title 31 [the Bank
Secrecy Act], or of section
1956 or 1957 of this title, or which is tracea65
ble to such property."

Cross border enforcement of civil forfeiture provisions is likely to
produce even more significant long-term results than prosecution of individual money launderers. The sequel to the first arrests off Aruba for
violation of the Act described previously, points to a government strategy in which criminal prosecution will always be complemented by civil
forfeiture actions having an international aspect.
At some point, the Aruban launderers crossed paths with a government money laundering sting operation. As described in an indictment
returned on March 3, 1989,66 government agents determined that they
were dealing with a one billion dollar laundering operation (known as
"La Mina") of the Medellin Cartel, which is responsible for most of the
cocaine imported into the United States, and which is now expanding
into the European market through Spain. The launderers deposited
millions of dollars of drug proceeds into domestic banks primarily in
New York and Los Angeles, then wired the money to bank accounts in
Panama, Uruguay, Colombia, France, the British Commonwealth, Luxembourg, Spain, Germany and Switzerland. 8 The monies were then
used to buy planes and stash houses in the United States, to pay for
raw materials in Colombia and Bolivia, to buy gold in Bolivia which
was used to launder drug money and to make investments in Luxembourg and other countries." Among other things, the defendants were
charged with a money laundering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1956.70

Three weeks later, the government filed a civil suit which sought
to direct nine New York banks to transfer $433,461,255.64 of laundered
63.
64.
65.
States
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), (b)(1), (2) (Supp. IV 1986).
18 U.S.C. § 3623(a)(3), (c)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A), 982(a) (Supp. IV 1988) (emphasis added); see United
v. Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986).
See generally United States v. Escobar-Gaviria, CR 89-086A (N.D. Ga. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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funds back to New York from. offshore so that they could be forfeited
to the government.7 1 The government suit sought relief based on the
forfeiture provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 881 and 18 U.S.C. § 981, and predicated personal jurisdiction on the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f), and New
York's long-arm statute, New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules Section 302(a)(1)."
This bold attempt to reverse the laundering cycle effectively would
enable American courts to reach laundered monies anywhere in the
world, using traditional civil concepts of jurisdiction. In the process,
banks may be pitted against their own customers who issue contrary
instructions or who seek the protection of foreign courts and foreign
laws to block any such transfer. American banks with foreign branches
may be forced to choose which directions to obey, those of American or
foreign courts, or their customers. This case, which relied heavily on
wiretaps, is still pending and should be watched very closely.
E. Private Actions
Purely private civil consequences may also flow from money laundering78 since two of the laundering offenses, as well as Bank Secrecy
Act violations, are RICO predicate offenses. 7 4 Some financial institutions-most likely banks or brokerage firms-will find themselves the
targets of civil suits premised upon the theory that unchecked money
laundering caused substantial damages to an unsuspecting third
party.7 5 Imaginative plaintiffs may yet find new ways to abuse both
civil RICO and the Act.
F. ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
The international scope of the Act may quell old controversies
over foreign secrecy laws and ignite new ones. The three substantive
laundering offenses-financial transactions, international transporta71.

See generally United States v. $433,461,255.64, and Bank of New York, Republic

National Bank, American Express Bank, Banco Commerciale Italiana, Bankamerica In-

ternational, Citibank, Extebank, Bank of Credit and Commerce, Bancamerica Casa Bancaria, et al., 89 Civ. 2091 (S.D.N.Y 1989).
72. Id.
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) ("Any person injured in his business or property by reason of [a pattern of racketeering activity] shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.").
74. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
75. See, e.g., Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 474 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) ("Any recoverable damages occurring by reason of a violation of [RICO] will flow from the commission
of the predicate acts."); see also Grunwald v. Bornfreund, 668 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y.
1987).
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tion, and criminally derived property transactions-can reach conduct
which occurs wholly outside of the United States. The roots of this
extraterritorial jurisdiction are found in established principles summarized by Mr. Justice Holmes: "Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a
state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at
the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within its
17
power.
Under international law, five general principles are applied to determine whether a nation may validly exercise criminal jurisdiction beyond its borders: 1) the territorial principle, which focuses on the place
where the offense is committed; 2) the nationality principle, which
looks to the nationality or national character of the person who committed the offense; 3) the protective principle, under which jurisdiction
is determined by reference to the national interest injured by the offense; 4) the universality principle, which looks to the custody of the
offender; and 5) the passive personality principle, which determines jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the
person injured by the offense."
The Act relies primarily on the first three principles for its global
reach. The existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction for the Act's laundering offenses depends on the dollar amount laundered, the locus of
the crime, and the nationality of the launderer. First, the criminally
derived property or the laundered or transported funds must exceed
$10,000.8 Second, criminal money laundering which takes place wholly
outside of the territorial United States can violate United States law
only when the launderer is an American citizen, corporation, subsidiary
or partnership9 Where the laundering conduct occurs in part in the
76. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911); see also United States v. Bowman,
260 U.S. 94 (1922); United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1983)
(construing the extraterritorial effect of 21 U.S.C. § 955(a) in the absence of a territorial
nexus); accord United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. 459 U.S. 1114 (1983); United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 369
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982).
77. See Harvard Research on International Law, Jurisdiction With Respect to
Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1986); 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
79. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(f), 1957(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). In particular, the criminally
derived property offense is given extraterritorial jurisdiction when committed by a
United States person, which is defined as:
[A] national of the United States, a sole proprietorship, partnership, company or
association composed principally of national or permanent resident aliens of the
United States; and, a corporation organized under the laws of the United States,
the District of Columbia, any State, or any territory or possession of the United
States, and a foreign subsidiary of such corporation.
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United States, and either is done by an alien,"0 or involves proceeds
from drug trafficking which violates the laws of other nations,"' the law
also has an extraterritorial impact. Finally, jurisdiction over the criminally derived property offense is likewise present if committed within
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States."2
The law does not explicitly limit the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to criminal offenses as opposed to conduct which gives rise
solely to civil penalties.
The concepts of extraterritorial jurisdiction seem to anticipate and
reach a money laundering cycle important to international drug cartels.
Currency produced from street drug sales is often shipped in bulk to
cash laundering points such as Panama,8 3 Hong Kong 4 or Switzerland," to then enter international financial channels mainly through
banks. In such situations, where no United States citizens are involved,
jurisdiction may depend upon when the laundering process
commenced.
The Act prohibits "initiating"8' 6 a "transfer, delivery or other disposition"8 7 of the criminal proceeds. Conceptually, the laundering process in the drug trade begins when money passes from the narcotics
buyer to the dealer and when some step is taken thereafter to hide this
illegal gain. When viewed in this manner, drug money laundering always begins in the United States. Therefore, the idea of initiating a
laundering transaction encompasses a point in time far earlier in the
cycle than, for example, when the launderer steps up to the teller's
window in Panama.8 8 If laundering is viewed as it is in fact, i.e., more
of a continuous process rather than a series of isolated events, then
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Act could ensnare foreigners who
never set foot in the United States as long as the process is started in
the United States by a co-conspirator. A mere attempt by aliens
outside of the United States to initiate or engage in prohibited transactions is also within the law's reach as long as the transactions are "in18 U.S.C. § 3077(d)(A), (D), (F) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f) (Supp. IV 1986).
81. Id. § 1956(c)(7)(B).
82. Id. § 1957(d). The special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States includes the high seas, certain vessels, aircraft, island, and spaceships, as well as
"[any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or
against a national of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
83. See THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 2, at 14-15.
84. Id. at 15-17.
85. Id. at 31-35.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
87. Id. § 1956(c)(3).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Milan-Rodriguez, 759 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1985).
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tended to take effect"89 in the United States.
When drug money is laundered, the effectiveness of an assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction should be supported by the protective principle of international law. This principle enables a state "to prescribe a
rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct outside its territory
that threatens the operation of its governmental functions."90 The
United States has realized the threat posed by narcotics trafficking in a
partially declassified national security directive which states that "the
international drug trade is a national security concern because of its
ability to destabilize democratic allies through the corruption of police
and judicial institutions."9 This directive implicitly recognizes a collective right of self-defense by all nations against the international
narcotrafficante. This sentiment was echoed by Congress when it
linked money laundering itself to United States national security interests: "The Congress finds that international currency transactions, especially in United States currency, that involve proceeds of narcotics
trafficking fuel trade in narcotics in the United States and worldwide
and consequently are a threat to the national security of the United
States."9 2 The mutual interest in avoiding the destabilization of Colombia, for example, makes it likely that the United States will turn to
anti-money laundering measures as a primary means to combat the cocaine trade. Other options, including extradition of leaders of cocaine
cartels, no longer seem to be available.9 "
G.

Adoption of Foreign Law

The desire to achieve international consensus on the threat from
the drug trade is also seen in the Act itself, by attempting to accommodate the sovereign interests of other nations in the financial affairs of
89.

Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 623 (1927).

90.

In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663, 666 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215

(1983) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 33 (1965)).
91. Statement of Vice President Bush, reprinted in Lewis, Bush Discloses Secret Order Citing Drugs as Security Peril, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1. This
directive, expressing a national security interest in the stability of other nations, apparently served as the basis for the use of United States army troops in Bolivia to assist in
countering narcotics efforts, Taylor, Bolivia Plan:Legal Doubts; Military-PoliceSplit
is Seen to be Eroded, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1986, at A6, col. 1, and for giving enforcement

authorities access to a CIA wiretap in Mexico, Ostrow, CIA, DEA Reportedly at Odds on
Use of Mexico Wiretap Information, L.A. Times, Nov. 20, 1986, at 19, col. 1.
92. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 4702(a), 102 Stat. 4291
(Supp. 1989).

93. See Riding, Colombians Grow Weary of Waging the War on Drugs, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 1, 1988, § 1, at Al, col. 4.
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their citizens, while addressing the economics of the international drug
problem. In two instances, the Act actually adopts the criminal laws of
other nations which prohibit the manufacture, importation, sale or distribution of controlled substances. First, the transaction, transportation and criminally derived property offenses prohibit the laundering
of the proceeds from drug trafficking committed in violation of the
laws of another nation."' Second, foreign nations are able to seek,
through the courts of the United States, the civil forfeiture of assets
found here which represent the proceeds of drug trafficking conducted
in violation of foreign laws. 5
This international forfeiture mechanism was designed in part to
implement the treaty between the United States and Italy on Mutual
Assistance on Criminal Matters." The Italian government was concerned that no vehicle existed by which that nation could recapture the
assets of Italian heroin traffickers which were located in the United
States.
In some cases, the Act's international forfeiture procedures may
reduce federal enforcement interest in offshore financial records by
leaving the prosecutorial function to other nations and the forfeiture
function to the United States. In this scenario, American financial institutions and business interests would act as mere stakeholders of
criminal proceeds found here. The need for bilateral treaties to gain
access to offshore records would diminish as a consequence. Nonetheless, by grappling realistically with the global scale of the narcotics
problem, the Act will impose on federal district courts the complex
94. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), (2), (c)(7); § 1957(a), (0(3) (Supp. IV 1986). The idea
that the United States should not become a haven for investments by foreign drug traffickers is a goal of Canada and Switzerland, which have analogous provisions in their
laws. Senate Hearings, supra note 45, at 64 (testimony of Stephen S. Trott, Assistant
Attorney General).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
96. Treaty of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 13, 1985, United StatesItaly, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1539 (1985). Article 18 of the Treaty reads:
Immobilization and Forfeiture of Assets
1 In emergency situations, the Requested State shall have authority to immobilize assets found in that State which are subject to forfeiture.
2. Following such judicial proceedings as would be required under the laws of
the Requested State, that State shall have the authority to order the forfeiture to the Requesting State of assets immobilized pursuant to paragraph 1
of this Article.
Thus, as a report by the Senate Judiciary Committee noted, "both countries
are to have the authority to seize assets found within their borders and to forfeit
such assets for the benefit of the other country based upon a violation of the
other country's laws."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 24.
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task of interpreting and enforcing the criminal narcotics laws of drug
source and transit countries as remote as Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand
and Bolivia."
H.

Self-Imposed Restraints

Administrative controls should act as a check on the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Recognizing the implication of its crossborder powers, the Department of Justice requires high level approval
to commence a grand jury investigation or prosecution of laundering
offenses:
Due to the potential international sensitivities, as well as proof
problems, involved in utilization of this extraterritorial provision, no grand jury investigation may be commenced, indictment returned, or complaint filed without the prior written approval of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
criminal division when jurisdiction to prosecute this offense exists only because of this extraterritorial provision. 8
In addition, the Justice Department requires both consultation with
the Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Section and its review of written
prosecutive memoranda before prosecution is begun."
These layers of review are bound to be seen by prosecutors as
cumbersome and by defense counsel as a possible means to undercut
the authority of a local United States Attorney. It is the opinion of this
author that administrative oversight is the proper method of achieving
the complicated function of balancing individual rights with society's
interest in law enforcement in a setting which could affect relations
between nations. Local prosecutors are rarely in a position to make this
judgment 0 0 and, as noted below, the courts do not appear to be any
better suited for the task.
I.

Offshore Damage Control

Some American financial institutions labor under misconceptions
about the Act which could prove quite damaging. The first of these is
97. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1; FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1. In both the criminal and civil context
the determination of foreign law is treated as a procedural rather than an evidentiary
matter. Courts may consider "any relevant material" to assist them in making such determinations. Id.
98. U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at tit. 9-105.100.
99.

U.S. DEPT.

OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK ON THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF

[hereinafter ANTI-DRUG ACT HANDBOOK].
100. See U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at tit. 9-4.543.

1986 95 (1987)
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that corporate liability for laundering offenses can be minimized by
employing only foreign citizens overseas. According to this logic, since
extraterritorial jurisdiction over United States citizens is limited, corporate exposure can be correspondingly limited by employing aliens
overseas. As previously seen, however, a realistic view of the drug
money laundering process will often include conduct beginning in the
United States. Thus, the laundering conduct of a bank employee who
is not a United States citizen could render an overseas bank criminally
responsible since corporate liability under such circumstances depends
solely on respondeat superior principles.101 As a result, corporate damage control which depends solely on the foreign nationality of employees in offshore bank operations is likely to be of marginal value as a
means of insulating a financial institution from the consequences of the
acts of its employees.
It is generally overlooked that the Act gives the Bank Secrecy Act
an international, albeit limited, dimension. Although the Bank Secrecy
Act's reporting and record-keeping requirements continue to apply
only to domestic financial institutions,0 2 the Act asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction over those who know that a transaction or transportation seeks "to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under Federal
or State law."' 0 3 This means that where criminal proceeds are involved,
a person or bank outside of the United States who acts to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file the appropriate Bank Secrecy
Act reports (or those required by state law) may have committed a
substantive laundering offense.
Due to the breadth of the Act, financial institutions should err on
the side of interpreting the Act expansively, consistent with its purposes. Domestic financial institutions would be well advised to consider
extending boards of directors oversight and somewhat modified compliance functions and policy to offshore operations. Otherwise, a renegade alien employee may trigger corporate liability for a bank which
has left itself completely unprotected.
III.

PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACT: OBTAINING EVIDENCE
ABROAD

The extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Act will prove to be only as
effective as the means available to collect evidence of the several laundering offenses. The issue arises as to whether the government's evi101.

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

102. See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(b)(1) (1982).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), (a)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986); see also supra note
48 and accompanying text.
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dence-gathering powers are co-extensive with its ability to prosecute
and to impose civil penalties for laundering conduct which occurs
wholly or partially outside of the United States. Put simply, the question is this: Does a grand jury now have extraterritorial jurisdiction to
investigate possible violations of the Act?
The answer to this question is of great importance to financial institutions and legitimate businesses. Their concerns extend beyond the
unlikely event of criminal prosecution to their more routine position as
unknowing stakeholders responding to a subpoena. Overzealous resort
to these new laundering laws can make both banks and businesses adversaries of their own customers. On its face, the Act offers no compromise between the needs of law enforcement and the often legitimate
interests served by financial privacy. Effective advocacy in this field
requires some historical perspective.
A.

Methods of Obtaining Evidence

Federal courts have the power to compel evidence from abroad,
apart from the explicit Congressional assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Act. Documentary evidence may be obtained from a foreign country through any of four ways: mutual assistance or tax treaties, letters rogatory, grand jury subpoenas duces tecum, and so-called
consent directives.
Mutual assistance treaties enable prosecutors in the United States
to obtain testimony and documentary evidence from a foreign country
which is a party to the treaty.'" Such treaties are in force today between the United States and the following countries: Switzerland, 03
Italy,'06 the Netherlands (including the Netherlands Antilles)0 7 and
Turkey.108 Treaties with Canada,1 09 the Cayman Islands," Colom104. Committee Hearing, supra note 50, at 114 (testimony of William Weld, Assistant Attorney General). Michele Sindona believed that cooperative treaties "have no
value at all, because they've been drawn up by people who are incompetent in international banking and monetary matters." N. ToscHEs, supra note 4, at 88.
105. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United StatesSwitzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter Swiss-American Treaty].
106. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 13, 1985, United StatesItaly, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1539 (1985).
107. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 12, 1981, United StatesNetherlands, T.I.A.S. No. 10734.
108. Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979,
United States-Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S. No. 9891.
109. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, United
States-Canada, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1092 (1985).
110. Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, United Kingdom-United States, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 537 (1987).
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bia,"' Morocco,""2 and Thailand' 3 have been negotiated and signed.
Negotiations are underway with Australia, Jamaica, the Bahamas, the
United Kingdom, Germany, Israel, Mexico and Panama;"' agreements
on the text of the Bahamian and Mexican treaties have already been
reached."" By their terms and practice, the scope and application of
these treaties are not as broad as the powers of federal grand juries
because they are either limited to seeking evidence of certain specific
crimes, or the government is unable to make a sufficient factual showing to invoke their provisions."'
The second method of obtaining documentary evidence from a foreign country is through letters rogatory. A letter rogatory is a formal
request by a court of the United States to a foreign court asking the
foreign court for assistance in securing real evidence or testimony in
that foreign country." 7 Apart from bilateral treaties, this has been the
long accepted method for obtaining evidence abroad. They are, however, regarded by federal prosecutors as too time consuming,"' and
therefore, are used only as a last resort."19
The third method is the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum by a
federal grand jury. 20 Typically, such subpoenas have been served on
United States-based banks or business enterprises which maintained
an office in the foreign country where the subpoenaed records were lo111. The treaty was ratified by the United States Senate on December 2, 1981 and
signed on January 4, 1982, but it has not been ratified by Colombia. Treaty 97-11, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
112. The treaty was ratified by the United States Senate on June 28, 1984 and signed
on July 13, 1984, but it has not been ratified by Morocco. Treaty 98-24, 98th Cong., 2d
Seas. (1984).
113. The treaty was signed on March 19, 1986, but it has not been ratified by the
Senate of Thailand. Treaty 100-18, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
114. Committee Hearing, supra note 50, at 115 (testimony of William Weld, Assistant Attorney General).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Swiss-American Treaty, supra note 105, art. 4.2. Under this article,
compulsory measures are available only with respect to offenses in the schedule of offenses which are mutually criminal.
117. Former United States Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti stated that "[lI]etters
rogatory involve unnecessary formalities, unacceptable delays, unresponsive channels of
communication, and ineffective procedures for obtaining evidence in a form for timely
use." In re Grand Jury 81-2, 550 F. Supp. 25, 29 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
118. See Olsen, Discovery in Federal Criminal Investigations Bank of Nova Scotia
Precedent, 16 N.Y.U. J. Ir'r'L L. & POL. 999, 1002 (1984); see also United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165, 171-74 (6th Cir. 1971) for a discussion on the use of letters rogatory.
119. U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at tit. 9-4.510.
120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c) provides that "[a) subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects
therein." Id.
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cated or on foreign banks doing business in the United States.
The fourth method is the consent directive. In this scenario, the
grand jury may compel a witness subpoenaed before the grand jury to
execute a written authorization to foreign banks to disclose records of
his accounts.12 1 Offshore banks then would honor the authorization and
provide the records to the grand jury.
B. Department of Justice Guidelines-The Department of the
Treasury's Global Reach
Although current Department of Justice guidelines permit the issuance of international grand jury subpoenas only when absolutely
necessary, 122 they are being used with increasing frequency.12 The Jus-

tice Department has removed from the United States Attorneys the
authority to issue subpoenas seeking evidence from overseas. The Department's Office of International Affairs now has this responsibility
and takes into account the following factors in determining whether to
authorize the service of a subpoena requiring the production of records
located abroad:
1. The availability of alternative methods for obtaining the
records in a timely manner, such as use of mutual assistance treaties, tax treaties or letters rogatory;
2. The indispensability of the records to the success of the
investigation or prosecution; and
3. The need to protect against the destruction of records located abroad and to protect the United States' ability to
prosecute for contempt or obstruction of justice for such
1

destruction.

24

These four means of gathering evidence-mutual assistance treaties, letters rogatory, subpoenas, and consent directives-may be complemented by a fifth where laundering offenses are at issue. As has
been said, the Department of the Treasury has a new authority to summon both testimonial and documentary evidence.1 25 The purpose of

this authority was to enhance civil enforcement of the Bank Secrecy
121. Doe v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2341 (1988).
122. U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at tit. 9-4.543.
123. See, e.g., In re Marc Rich Co., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215
(1983); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1119 (1983).
124. U.S. ArORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at tit. 9-4.543.
125.

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Act.1 2 6 Congress has said explicitly that the Treasury Department's
civil summons power may be given extraterritorial effect:
Under the new section 5318(a)(4) this summons authority may
be used against any financial institution, whether foreign or
domestic, regulated by the Treasury Department. Concerns
have been raised about the application of this authority to obtain records of foreign financial activity through the issuance of
a subpoena to a U.S. branch of a predominantly offshore financial institution. The primary concern is that compliance with
such a subpoena may force the institution to violate the strict
financial privacy laws of other nations, such as the Bahamas or
the Cayman Islands, from which records may be sought. It is
the Committee's intention that efforts should be made, at least
in the first instance, to resolve any conflicts that may arise between U.S. law enforcement interests and foreign secrecy laws
through diplomatic efforts. If diplomatic efforts prove to be unsuccessful, however, the Committee expects such conflicts to be
resolved by a careful balancing of the competing interests, in
accordance with the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia,
740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. First
Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1982).127
Both Congress and the Department of Justice have expressed the view
that information developed from a civil summons may be used in a
subsequent or collateral proceeding whether or not the Bank Secrecy
128
Act is involved.
Because money laundering and currency reporting violations often
go hand-in-hand, evidence of one tends to prove the other. Evidence
gathered by the Treasury Department for civil purposes would likely
be of value in a laundering investigation or prosecution. Thus, in a little noted aspect of the law, the Act sets up a means around the traditional methods of securing evidence from abroad. This significant new
weapon in the government's arsenal should be kept in mind when looking at the manner in which the courts have sought to reconcile the
authority of the grand jury with foreign sovereignty.

126.

SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 17.

127.

Id. at 17-18.

128.

See ANTI-DRUG AcT HANDBOOK, supra note 99, at 93.
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C. Foreign Non-Disclosure Law
Recent case law has dramatically broadened the power of the
grand jury to gain access to the records of foreign bank accounts and
other foreign entities used by narcotics traffickers, organized crime
figures and white collar criminals who launder the proceeds of illegal
activities or engage in tax fraud schemes. The following discussion will
focus on the evolution of federal law regarding the validity of a grand
jury subpoena duces tecum in an international context before enactment of the Money Laundering Control Act and in the absence of its
declaration of extraterritorial jurisdiction over money laundering
offenses.
Subpoenaed records are often protected by bank and commercial
secrecy laws of other countries, in much the same way that the Right
to Financial Privacy Act protects domestic financial records. Although
these non-disclosure laws have been promulgated, on occasion, to
thwart the extraterritorial application of United States laws, they are
'
not intended "to foster or encourage criminal activities."129
These so13
s
0
called "blocking statutes
are also viewed as a means to vindicate
national sovereignty.3 3 Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code is an exam3
ple of such a nondisclosure law. 1
At times, blocking statutes come in direct conflict with the broad
authority of the grand jury. When a United States-based entity is ordered to comply with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum to produce
documents located outside the United States, the claim is often made
that compliance would subject the entity to criminal or civil sanctions
of a foreign secrecy law. Nonetheless, United States courts may resort
to the contempt power to compel compliance; while they have not always utilized this power, their willingness to do so has become apparent over the past twenty-five years, even in the area of civil
discovery.'
129. See Note, Compelling Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Laws:
An Examination and Reevaluation of the American Position, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 877,
879 (1982); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia), 740 F.2d 817, 829 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
130. See RESTATEMENT (REviSED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §
437, reporters' note 4 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
131. See Note, supra note 129, at 880.
132. CODE PENAL SUISSE [CP] art. 273. Article 273 provides that "[a] person who spies
out a manufacturing or business secret to make it accessible to a foreign governmental
authority... shall be punished with prison, in severe cases with jail. The imprisonment
may be combined." Id.
133. See generally April & Fried, Compelling Discovery and Disclosure in Transnational Litigation: A Canadian View, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 961 (1984).
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From the reported cases, it is not possible to determine the extent
to which foreign courts or governments have actually imposed sanctions following compliance with an order from a court of the United
States to produce documents located outside of the country. To the
extent, however, that a trend is discernible, it is this: The effect of foreign blocking legislation on the issuance of compliance orders by
United States courts decreases in relation to the significance of the
United States government's interest perceived to be at stake.
United States courts have utilized three approaches to determine
whether or not to enforce a grand jury subpoena which may implicate
sanctions under foreign law: 1) international comity; 2) balancing of
interests; and 3) paramount interest. Before reviewing these, however,
it is important to understand the function of the grand jury.
D. Role of the Grand Jury
The grand jury "is an arm of the Court' ' 4 and its powers are very
broad." 5 Its roles include "both the determination whether there is
probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecution."' 3"
The grand jury is allowed wide discretion in seeking evidence' 3 7
for, as the Supreme Court noted, "[a] grand jury's investigation is not
fully carried out until every available clue has been run down . . . in
every proper way to find if a crime has been committed," although this
power is not unlimited.' 8 The exclusionary rule for evidence illegally
obtained does not apply to the grand jury," 9 and not even the President of the United States can circumvent its power.14 0 The grand jury's
134. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617 (1960).
135. In Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919), the United States Supreme Court
stated:
[The grand jury] is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and
inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the possible results of the investigation, or by
doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to accusation of crime.
Id. at 282. For a general discussion on the role and the history of the grand jury, see id.
at 279-83; see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
136. 414 U.S. at 343; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
137. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
138. See 414 U.S. at 343; see also 410 U.S. at 11-12 (discussing limitations on grand
jury subpoena power).
139. See 414 U.S. at 338.
140. See' Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also United States v.
Leyva, 513 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1975) (one may not refuse to testify before grand juries due
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authority to subpoena "is not only historic but essential to its task," ''
and its resort to contempt powers extends even to the production of
records found overseas. 4 2 The grand jury may even direct witnesses to
allow offshore banks to release documents relevant to its
investigation.' 4
In cases of organized crime or other economically motivated crime,
banking or commercial records may provide direct evidence of illegal
activity or its motive. Thus, in this context, a subpoena duces tecum
seeking financial records is almost always essential to complete the investigation. When the subpoenaed documents are located abroad, however, the authority of the grand jury has sometimes given way to the
sovereign interests of other nations.
E.

InternationalComity Approach

In the 1962 Chase ManhattanBank case, 4 4 a grand jury subpoena
served on Chase in New York ordered Chase to produce certain banking records "wherever held.' 4 Chase resisted compliance for fear that
production of the relevant records in its Panamanian branches would
subject Chase to a fine under Panamanian law." 6 Moreover, Chase offered expert testimony that, under Panamanian law, American authorities could only gain access to the Panamanian records through the
to fear of personal safety).
141. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1973).
142. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971). But see In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d
494, 498 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987) (judgment of contempt against
bank reversed because "[contempt] sanctions represent an attempt by an American
court to compel a foreign person to violate the laws of a different foreign sovereign on
that sovereign's own territory.").
143. See In re N.D.N.Y. Grand Jury Subpoena No. 86-0351-S, 811 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1987); In re United States Grand Jury Proceedings, W. Dist. of La., 767 F.2d 1131 (5th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932
(1984).
144. In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
145. Id. at 612.
146. Id. After the subpoena was served, the Panamanian legislature enacted a nondisclosure law which provided:
The merchant furnishing a copy or reproductions of the contents of his books,
correspondence and other documents for use in an action abroad, in compliance
with an order of an authority not of the Republic of Panama, shall be penalized
with a fine not greater than one hundred balboas.
Id. (quoting I Codigo de Comerci, tit. III, art. 89 (Panama 1961)). This violation of Panamanian law would be a misdemeanor under American law, according to testimony by
Chase's Panamanian counsel. Id. Since Panamanian and United States currencies are
directly related, Chase's one hundred balboa fine was equivalent to one hundred dollars.
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courts of Panama. 14 7

In accord with its decision in First National City Bank v. Internal
Revenue Service, 48 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
position of Chase, based on principles of international comity: "[J]ust
as we would expect and require branches to abide by our laws applicable to the conduct of their business in this country, so should we honor
their laws affecting our bank branches which are permitted to do business in foreign countries."' 4 9
F. Balancing of Interests
The rule of refusing compliance for reasons of simple comity when
the subpoena conflicted with foreign law was abandoned by the Second
Circuit several years later. In United States v. First National City
Bank, 50 Citibank was held in contempt for its failure to comply with a
subpoena duces tecum in a grand jury inquiry into antitrust violations.
Citibank had resisted production of some documents located in Frankfurt, claiming that compliance was forbidden by German bank secrecy
law and would subject it to civil liability and economic loss in Germany. 5 ' Emphasizing that the risk or absence of foreign criminal liability did not resolve the issue, the connection between jurisdiction and
its exercise was explained as follows:
It is no longer open to doubt that a federal court has the power
to require the production of documents located in foreign
countries if the court has in personam jurisdiction of the person in possession or control of the material .... Thus, the task

before us, as Citibank concedes, is not one of defining power
but of developing rules governing the proper exercise of
power.152

The Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the United
States offered guidance by which to balance the respective national interests of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany with
147. Id.
148. 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960) (IRS summons for
documents of foreign branch bank). If production would require action by personnel in
Panama in violation of the laws of Panama, production should not be ordered. Id. at 619.
149. In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962). The subpoena
was left outstanding to insure Chase's compliance with it if the United States government obtained authorization from Panama for disclosure of the documents. Id.
150. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'g In re First National City Bank, 285 F. Supp.
845 (S.D.N.Y.).
151. 396 F.2d at 898.
152. Id. at 900-01.
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the hardship, if any, that Citibank would face in complying: 153
When two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce
rules of law and when the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law to consider in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in light of such
factors as:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states; (b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person; (c) the extent
to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state; (d) the nationality of the person; and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state
can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the
rule prescribed by that state.""
The national and individual interests of each nation were weighed
against the historic importance of American antitrust laws, the lack of
any view expressed by either government, Citibank's lack of good faith,
and the absence in German law of criminal sanctions against bankers
for disclosure. 6 8
In finding that the German interest in secrecy was less substantial
than the American interest in enforcing its criminal laws,1" the Second
Circuit was decidedly unsympathetic to Citibank's predicament: "[Citibank] must confront the choice ... of the need to 'surrender to one
sovereign or the other the privileges received therefrom' or, alterna5
tively a willingness to accept the consequences. 1 7
Citibank's civil contempt adjudication and fine of $2,000 per day
were upheld.1 58 The notion that United States courts should always defer to foreign secrecy law when there is conflict with the grand jury
now finds little adherence in the federal courts which have considered
the issue in the past several years. For example, German law also
proved unavailing to Deutsche Bank which sought to avoid production
153.

Id. at 901.

154.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 40

(1965).
155. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 903-04 (1968). The court
observed that "when foreign governments, including Germany, have considered their national interests threatened, they have not hesitated to make known their objections ...
to the issuing court." Id. at 904.
156. Id. at 905.
157. Id. at 905 (citation omitted).
158. Id. at 900.
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of records located in Germany before a Michigan grand jury investigating possible unlawful conduct in the sale of diesels produced by the
Krupp organization. "
It should be noted, however, that the movement away from international comity as a guiding decisional principle has not been uniform.
The District of Columbia Circuit clearly bucked the trend towards expanding the offshore reach of the grand jury in its 1987 decision in In
re Sealed Case.' In that case, a subpoena was served on a United
States branch of a foreign bank seeking records located outside of the
United States in an investigation of possible violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. In reversing the district court's contempt adjudication, the
court relied heavily on "basic principles of international comity." The
court emphasized that "[m]ost important to our decision is the fact
that these sanctions represent an attempt by an American court to
compel a foreign person to violate the laws of a different foreign sovereign on that sovereign's own territory."''
The premise of the opinion, repeated over and over, is that compliance with a grand jury subpoena and consequent disclosure would
occur on foreign soil. Yet, it could not be more obvious that any disclosure would only occur before a grand jury sitting in the United States.
Thus, the rationale of international comity in In re Sealed Case rests
upon a faulty premise which should undermine its precedential value
in other circuits.
The balancing approach has also been applied to the enforcement
of summonses issued by regulatory bodies such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Securities and Exchange Commission.' 62 In the in159. In re Grand Jury 81-2, 550 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. Mich. 1982). The district court
had in personam jurisdiction over the Deutsche Bank because it had an office in New
York. Id. at 27. The violation of German law was alleged to be noncompliance with an
injunction issued at an ex parte hearing by a German court at which the United States
was not present. Id. at 28. Although the bank argued it would have been exposed to
criminal and civil liability, this was disputed by Dr. Otto Walter, an expert on German
law, who testified that, except for a possible violation of its contractual obligation, no
other provision of German law would impose liability. Id. at n.1.
160. 825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987).
161. 825 F.2d at 498. The court did recognize that "[i]f we were asked to act in accord with such a distinct and express grant of power, it would be our duty to do so." Id.
at 499. One is then left to conclude that if the grand jury were investigating a money
laundering offense with their explicit extraterritorial aspect, the subpoena would have
been upheld.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981) (IRS summons); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 2 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (SEC summons). But cf. United States v. Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983); First Nat'l
City Bank of New York v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. Minas de Artemisa,
150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945) (utilizing international comity approach).
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ternational community, these summonses seem to be more widely accepted than the broad civil discovery which is permitted in the United
States because they appear to serve 1 a3 more pressing national function
analogous to that of the grand jury.
G.

Paramount Interest

Other decisions point to a progressively enhanced ability of the
grand jury to gain access to records of foreign bank accounts through
compliance induced by substantial daily fines. The so-called Bank of
Nova Scotia cases 16 4 extended the power of the federal grand jury subpoena duces tecum further than any of the previous cases because the
bank was subjected to criminal prosecution under foreign law, rather
than civil penalties, as in earlier cases.'"5 Their thrust seems to be that
the interest of the United States in criminal law enforcement is always
superior to the interest of other nations or the private sector in financial secrecy. In other words, a grand jury inquiry always tips the scales
in favor of disclosure since the investigation of criminal conduct is the
paramount interest a fortiori.
In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in United
States v. Bank of Nova Scotia,"' (Nova Scotia I) held that a Bahamian branch of a Canadian chartered bank was required to comply
with a federal grand jury subpoena duces tecum, despite the possibility
that disclosure might have subjected the bank to Bahamian criminal
sanctions for violation of bank secrecy laws. 6 7 The court relied on the
balancing test enunciated in the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the United States and concluded that the Bahamian national interest manifested in the secrecy laws was not "sufficient to
outweigh the United States' interest in collecting revenues and insuring an unimpeded and efficacious grand jury process.' 6 s The court also
found that no viable alternative means of disclosure was available. 6 ,
163. 644 F.2d at 1339; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Field),
532 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
164. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia), 740 F.2d
817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985) United States v. Bank of Nova
Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
165. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); In
re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
166. 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
167. 691 F.2d at 1388-89. These sanctions included a fine not to exceed $15,000 or a
term of imprisonment not to exceed two years or both a fine and imprisonment. Id. at
1386 n.2.
168. Id. at 1391.
169. Id. at 1390-91.

N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

(Vol. 9

One commentator has noted that the Nova Scotia I court should
have broadened its analysis of the balancing test 7 ' to focus more on
the quandary of the multinational business, instead of solely on each
state's national interests with "greater consideration to the 'nature' of
the penalty to be imposed by the foreign jurisdiction on the bank upon
its compliance with the subpoena."'7 1 Yet, this criticism encourages
courts to engage in speculation over probable foreign response to a
compliance order.
Whether foreign blocking or secrecy laws will actually produce
sanctions should not determine whether jurisdiction is validly asserted.
To make the likelihood of sanctions an issue could produce unusual,
protracted litigation with a heavy political flavor. For example, the use
of the Bahamas as a drug shipment point and the attendant corruption
of public officials'7 2 might have made the imposition of sanctions likely
in the Nova Scotia I case to protect the drug trade rather than to protect Bahamian sovereignty. The indictment of Panama's de facto president, General Manuel Noriega, on drug charges would raise similar
concerns if Panamanian bank records were subpoenaed. 73 Under these
circumstances, the speculative reaction of other governments to the
purely private dilemma of a bank would implicate political questions
not normally subject to scrutiny by federal courts and which are better
left to those knowledgeable in. foreign policy in accord with the "act of
state doctrine.'

74

Subsequently, the Bank of Nova Scotia was issued a subpoena by
another grand jury investigating a different customer as part of a narcotics trafficking inquiry. In this case, In re Grand Jury Proceedings
170.

N.Y.L.

Comment, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Nova Scotia), 5
SCH. J. INT'L & CoM.

171. Id. at 469 n.107.
172. See PRESIDENT'S

L. 457, 470 (1984).

COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: ORGANIZED CRIME AND COCAINE TRAFFICKING, RECORD OF

IV 241-74 (1984); Brinkley, Drugs and Graft Main Issue in Bahamas Vote,
N.Y. Times, June 14, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
173. See Shenon, Noriega Indicted by U.S. for Links to Illegal Drugs, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 6, 1988, at Al, col.5.
174. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384 (1965) ("for
overseas transactions are often caught in a web of extraterritorial activities and foreign
law beyond the ken of our federal courts of their competence."); O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v.
Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449, 452-53 (2d Cir. 1987); Republic of
the Phil. v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1481-83 (9th Cir. 1987); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28, 431-33 (1964). But see United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901 (2d Cir. 1968) ("the courts must take care not to impinge upon
the prerogatives and responsibilities of the political branches of the government in the
extremely sensitive and delicate area of foreign affairs.").
HEARING
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(United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia)' 75 (Nova Scotia II) the grand

jury sought records from Bank of Nova Scotia branches in Antigua, the
Bahamas and the Cayman Islands through service on the bank's Miami
office. 76 The bank was slow in complying, failed to quash the subpoena
by asserting that disclosure would violate Bahamian and Cayman Islands secrecy laws, and unsuccessfully sought the permission of a Cayman Islands' court to order the bank not to produce the records, although the denial of this order was never appealed.17 In the meantime,

the Attorney General of the Bahamas issued an order permitting disclosure, but compliance still continued to lag. 1 8 Even though the Elev7 9
enth Circuit gave a passing nod to the Restatement's balancing test,1
the Bank of Nova Scotia's real problems stemmed from its reported
lack of good faith and the recognition that stemming the tide of money
laundering is "indispensable to this nation's efforts to stop the narcotics trade."' 80 With this unambiguous language, notice was served that
foreign blocking laws do not count for much when drug trafficking is
under investigation:
In a world where commercial transactions are international in
scope, conflicts are inevitable. Courts and legislatures should
take every reasonable precaution to avoid placing individuals
in the situation [the Bank] finds [itlself. Yet, this court simply
cannot acquiesce in the proposition that United States criminal investigations must be thwarted whenever there is a conflict with the interest of other states.' 8
Thus, the court upheld the order of civil contempt and the imposition
of a $1,825,000 fine for the bank's failure to comply with the
subpoena.' 82
H. Marc Rich and the Long Arm of the Grand Jury
The Marc Rich case 8 3 demonstrates the global reach of the grand
jury in gathering evidence of the new laundering offenses. As far as is
175. 740 F.2d 817 (lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
176. 740 F.2d at 820.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 821.
179. Id. at 827.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 828 (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Field), 532
F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976)).
182. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia), 740 F.2d
817, 819-20 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
183. In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215
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known, Marc Rich represents the first time that a grand jury subpoenaed the records of a foreign corporation which did no legitimate business in the United States. Rather, jurisdiction was predicated wholly
upon the right of the grand jury to investigate. 8 The case is most
instructive because it explains the relationship between subject matter
jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction, and the manner of service on an
offshore corporation.
In Marc Rich, Marc Rich and Co., A.G. (Marc Rich), a Swiss corporation without an office in the United States, was a corporate target
of a grand jury investigation. It was served with a subpoena duces tecum by service on Marc Rich and Co. International Ltd. (Marc Rich
International), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Marc Rich which did business in New York.' 83 The subpoena requested documents of Marc
Rich located in Switzerland as part of an investigation into an alleged
tax evasion scheme involving the principals of each company whereby
Marc Rich International diverted at least $20 million of its taxable income to Marc Rich.'
Marc Rich resisted the subpoena on grounds that the district court
had no jurisdiction and that Swiss law prohibited production of the
documents. 187 The company was held in civil contempt by the district
court and fined $50,000 for each day the documents were not
produced. 8
The Second Circuit upheld the subpoena and the fine, basing its
jurisdiction on the protective8 9 and territorial8 0 principles of international criminal jurisdiction. A summary of these principles of subject
matter jurisdiction is not too startling: Acts outside the United States
(1983).
184. 707 F.2d at 669. As the court noted: "A federal court's jurisdiction is not determined by its powers to issue a subpoena; its power to issue a subpoena is determined by
its jurisdiction." Id. (citing United States v. Germann, 370 F.2d 1019, 1022-23 (2d Cir.),
vacated on other grounds, 389 U.S. 329 (1967)).
185. 707 F.2d at 665.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 670.
189. Id. at 666. "Under the protective principle, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe a
rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that threatens . . . the operation of government functions ..
" Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 33 (1965)).
190. Id. "The territorial principle is applicable when acts outside a jurisdiction are
intended to produce and do produce detrimental effects within it." Id. (citing United
States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968)); see
supra note 76; see also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).

19881

U.S. MONEY LAUNDERING LAWS

which are intended to and which do cause income tax evasion, or which
threaten the government's revenue collecting function, justify punishment for those acts as if they are committed here. After Marc Rich
paid $21 million in contempt fines, both Marc Rich and Marc Rich
International pleaded guilty to tax evasion, paid $150 million in back
taxes and interest, and were fined an additional $780,000."']
In Marc Rich, the Second Circuit left behind the international
comity and balancing of interests approaches to grand jury subpoenas-a sure reflection of the growing international character of economic crime. The subpoena power of the grand jury was extended to a
foreign corporation whose only reported United States contacts consisted of transactions alleged to be criminal. Regarding the conflict between United States and Swiss law, it is worth noting that the court:
(1) did not mention the Restatement's balancing test used in the First
National City Bank and Chase Manhattan cases; (2) gave no weight to
Switzerland's interest in secrecy; and (3) did not find relevant alternative means of production, i.e., the United States-Switzerland Tax'91
and Mutual Assistance Treaties. 93 In addition, personal jurisdiction
over Marc Rich rested on grounds never before expressed in the criminal law.
When the logic of Marc Rich is superimposed over the extraterritorial thrust of the Money Laundering Control Act, the next move in
the offshore shell game becomes predictable; a grand jury subpoena
served offshore on a foreign corporation having no contacts with the
United States for a laundering offense which occurred wholly outside
of the United States.'"
I. In Personam Jurisdiction
In a sense, Marc Rich was a money laundering case because profits
of a United States subsidiary were covertly shifted to its Swiss parent
corporation, which was apparently insulated from investigation by a
foreign blocking statute. This similarity to classic money laundering
scenarios makes it likely that the government will rely on its theory of
in personam jurisdiction in future investigations of the new laundering
offenses.
The test of in personam jurisdiction was a clear, practical. accom191. See Lubasch, Marc Rich's Companies Plead Guilty, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1984,
at D1, col. 3.
192. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 24, 1951, United StatesSwitzerland, 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316.
193. See Swiss-American Treaty, supra note 105.
194. For the admissibility of foreign records, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3491-3494 (1982).
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modation to the broad investigative role of the grand jury. Personal
jurisdiction over Marc Rich arose from service in the United States,"9 5
from the company's "contacts with the entire United States," ' and
from the hypothesis that the putative conspiracy and some conspiratorial acts must have occurred in the United States. 9 7 These factors
combined to make a likely foreign accomplice to a would-be United
States-based conspiracy amenable to a grand jury subpoena. A "cart
before the horse" approach was rejected with the recognition that it
was illogical to say that a corporation could be prosecuted upon a theory of "constructive presence," but that the grand jury could not investigate to see whether a crime had taken place.'
At least, it is now
clear in the Second Circuit that offshore criminal conduct is within the
reach of the grand jury provided that the government shows its hand
somewhat. As the court stated: "[I]f the government shows that there
is a reasonable probability that ultimately it will succeed in establishing the facts necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction, compliance with
the grand jury's subpoena may be directed."' 9 9
In dicta, the Marc Rich case offers guidelines for finding in personam jurisdiction over entities possessing information about illegal
conduct which is completely extraterritorial. As was noted in the case:
"[I]t may well be that the occurrence of the offense itself is sufficient
to support a claim of jurisdiction, provided adequate notice and opportunity to be heard has been given."200 Consistent with Marc Rich, the
government can be expected to argue that the putative commission of
an offshore laundering offense and proper service is all that is needed
to establish jurisdiction. Since neither the Federal Rules of Criminal
195. In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215
(1983). Service of Marc Rich's officers in the United States was deemed sufficient, since
the subpoena was actually accepted by International's attorney. Id. at 668 n.1. The manner of service was not challenged. Id.
196. 707 F.2d at 667. Minimum contacts normally refers to contacts with the forum
state. Resorting to a civil minimum contacts test could complicate analysis of the jurisdiction of the grand jury; see Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987); In re Arawak Trust Co., 489 F. Supp. 162, 163-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
197. 707 F.2d at 668.
198. Id. The court stated:
It would be strange, indeed, if the United States could punish a foreign corporation for violation of its criminal laws upon a theory that the corporation was
constructively present in the country at the time the violation occurred ... but a
federal grand jury could not investigate to ascertain the probability that a crime
had taken place.
Id. at 666 (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 670. The court also held that the facts necessary to establish jurisdiction
can be discovered by the documents required in the subpoena itself. Id. at 669.
. 200. Id. at 668.
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Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specify the method
of service on a foreign corporation, the manner of service outside of the
United States is left to the discretion of the district courts, 0 ' apparently limited only by the requirements of due process.
Although service may also be effected within the United States,
the Department of Justice has placed some restraints on the service of
a subpoena ad testificandum on an officer of, or attorney for, a foreign
bank or corporation "who is temporarily in, or passing through the
United States." ' Such a subpoena may only 2be
served with the con03
currence of the Office of International Affairs.
J.

The Strong Arm of the Grand Jury-The Consent Directive

When a person or entity with authority over foreign bank account
records is within the grand jury's jurisdiction, the consent directive is
likely to become the federal prosecutor's tool of choice to unlock the
account's secrets. In Doe v. United States, " the Supreme Court approved the practice of serving a subpoena on the target of a grand jury,
and then directing him to release records of his own Bermuda and
Cayman Islands bank accounts, notwithstanding the target's assertion
of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
The target, who was under investigation for fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and tax evasion, was required to sign a consent form
which, in part, read as follows:
I,
, of the State of Texas in the United States of
America, do hereby direct any bank or trust company at which
I may have a bank account of any kind or at which a corporation has a bank account of any kind upon which I am authorized to draw, and its officers, employees and agents, to disclose
all information and deliver copies of all documents of every nature in your possession and control which relate to said bank
account to [the] Grand Jury ....101

The Supreme Court upheld the authority of the grand jury to compel
execution of the directive even in the face of the secrecy laws of Bermuda and the Cayman Islands.
The effect of Doe, which treats the power of the grand jury as par201.
(1969);
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 670 (citing FED. R. Cv. P. 83); see also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942).
U.S. ArroRNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at tit. 9-4.543.
Id.
108 S. Ct. 2341 (1988).
Id. at 2344 n.2.
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amount, is to avoid confrontation with foreign blocking statutes
through disclosure authorized by the person whose confidentiality interests the statutes were intended to protect, e.g., the account holder.
This neat sidestep, which equates compulsion with consent, presents a
dilemma for offshore and domestic banks. Should they honor a consent
directive which was the product of the legitimate coercive power of the
grand jury? The problem is compounded for foreign branches of American banks with assets clearly within the reach of the federal courts
and their considerable power to impose contempt sanctions. When confronted with this situation, financial institutions would be well advised
to maintain a position as a neutral stakeholder, leaving assertion of
privacy interests to the account holder with appropriate notice.
All in all, the consent directive practice enlists offshore financial
institutions as active participants in enforcement efforts aimed at laundered monies. The logical next step for enforcement authorities is to
superimpose the consent directive principle on the law of forfeiture. It
would be less than a quantum leap for a grand jury next to order a
bank within its jurisdiction to transfer back to the United States laundered monies as evidence of criminal violations under investigation.
Once again, banks should keep a low profile to avoid getting caught in
the resultant crossfire.

IV.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

Some generalizations flow from the preceding analysis. Even
before the direct assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction evident in the
Money Laundering Act, federal courts had given the grand jury an almost unlimited ability to gather evidence against those criminals who
attempt to use foreign financial institutions as a haven for their illegal
profits. The Act furthers this progression by adding the explicit support of the legislative and executive branches to the full exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction where money laundering offenses are
involved.
The potent synergy between the Act's laundering offenses and the
government's international evidence-gathering capability creates the
need for a different response to the prospect of grand jury subpoenas
aimed offshore. Those who wish to express common sense objections to
such subpoenas should do so before, rather than after, service of the
subpoena. Initially, such concerns should be expressed to the United
States Attorney. A second level of review may be possible because of
the Justice Department's centralized control over the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Due to their supervisory authority in this
area, the Department's Office of International Affairs, Narcotic and
Dangerous Drug Section, and possibly, the Assistant Attorney General
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in charge of the Criminal Division, should be approached to review the
issue.
Future challenges to international subpoenas should not overlook
the adequacy of service or the lack of in personam jurisdiction evident
from the government's inability to establish a reasonable probability
that the grand jury will be able to exercise jurisdiction. Those who
wish to contest offshore subpoenas should aim at the character and
importance of the United States' interest at stake, in the particular
grand jury subpoena, in order to have more than a remote chance of
success. The decision to challenge should take into account the practical costs of noncompliance.
Only in the District of Columbia Circuit does violation of foreign
law remain a substantial, though falsely premised, argument for noncompliance.2 Still, an unequivocal declaration by a foreign sovereign
that it will impose sanctions in the event of compliance, support from
the State Department, or expert testimony on the adverse impact of
compliance on the national interests of the United States, might avert
a compliance order or contempt judgment. Even after compliance has
begun, the actual imposition of foreign sanctions may cause a court to
reconsider its original order.2" 7
V.

CONCLUSION

The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 will enable enforcement authorities to undermine the economic base and disrupt the cash
flow of organized crime The law is equally poised to deny access to,
and free use of, illegal gains to those who engage in virtually any financially-motivated crime. International financial institutions and businesses will be caught in the middle of the effort to control money
laundering.
The meaning of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the context of
money laundering should be clearly understood by multinational businesses and financial institutions in judging the impact of the Act. Be206. See In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451
(1987).
207. Legal sparring over access to individual bank records may be replaced by intergovernment conflict. Congress has required the Secretary of the Treasury to negotiate
international agreements to insure that foreign financial institutions maintain and provide access to records of large transactions in United States currency. Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 4702 (c), 102 Stat. 4291 (Supp. 1989). If, by October
1, 1989, such an agreement is not reached with a particular nation, its financial institutions may be denied access to United States dollar clearing and wire transfer systems,
and be prohibited from maintaining accounts with any banks chartered in the United
States. Id. §§ 4702 (d), (e).
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cause the law is transaction oriented, it can follow criminal proceeds
throughout the world in much the same way that nations assert jurisdiction over their citizens wherever they may be found. As a result, the
concept of extraterritoriality projects the money laundering laws of the
United States and aspects of the Bank Secrecy Act into foreign
branches of United States banks, businesses, brokerage firms and overseas branches of foreign banks.
The Act now gives federal grand juries a global reach to investigate money laundering through extraterritorial jurisdiction. United
States courts will continue to be increasingly active in upholding extraterritorial jurisdiction in the context of criminal conduct, especially
when national security is perceived to be at stake. Given the common
international interest in avoiding the destabilizing effect of narcotics
trafficking, the extraterritorial resort to grand jury subpoenas in drug
investigations will probably be met with less resistance from foreign
sovereigns than subpoenas served in other contexts.
Although important, the United States' interest in the effective
enforcement of its criminal law and in collecting taxes encourages
other countries to enact "blocking" legislation as a means of making
documents or records available only through less than efficient diplomatic channels. Therefore, in the long term, the United States should
continue to pursue mutual assistance treaties (preferably multilateral)
to facilitate the process of obtaining evidence from abroad. Such treaties will reduce the need for litigation, increase the efficiency of federal
prosecutions, reduce tensions produced by the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, remove the unfair pressure on financial institutions to
serve two masters, and recognize the legitimate interests served by financial privacy.
The authority of the grand jury to compel evidence from outside
the United States is inherent in jurisdiction. Given the expansive legislative intent behind the Act and the explicit assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Congress, 8 grand jury subpoenas which seek evidence of money laundering offenses are especially likely to be given
extraterritorial effect. In simple terms, the power to investigate is coextensive with the power to prosecute. The Act does not alter the general
rule that the power of the grand jury extends only as far as the court of
which it is an arm. Financial institutions in foreign countries should
expect an unfavorable response from United States courts when foreign blocking statutes are asserted in response to grand jury subpoenas
investigating money laundering violations. Even in the absence of a
208. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281 (1949); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
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territorial nexus to the offense, subpoenas which seek to investigate
offenses which "impact" here are likely to be upheld.
In the meantime, the government should focus its exceptional
powers where they belong-on the money launderer and outside of the
teller's window. To do otherwise is to avoid tackling organized crime at
its most vulnerable point-in the pocketbook at the cash connection.

